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SEASONABLE PROTESTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
RICHaARD A. EDWAlDS*
The desirability of excluding unreasonable seized evidence, from
the trial of one whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated,
has created and maintained a sharp divergence of opinion among
courts and commentators. Substantively, the federal courts have
long professed to accept the views of the "exclusionists" such as
Justice Holmes and Brandeis, thus nominally rejecting the protests
of Dean Wigmore and justice Cardozo on this point. Procedurally,
however, the federal courts have imposed two distinct limitations
upon the rule against the admission of evidence procured by an
unreasonable search and seizure.
The first such procedural limitation exists in the unusually re-
strictive application of the familiar doctrine of standing to raise
a constitutional issue. This limitation has been described elsewhere.,
The second procedural limitation arises from the unusually re-
strictive application of the equally familiar doctrine that constitu-
tional issues must be asserted seasonably or they will not be con-
sidered upon review by the Supreme Court. It is the purpose of
this article to analyze and describe this second procedural limitation
upon the only effective remedy for unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The General Requirement of Seasonable Assertion of Constitu-
tional Issues. Resting largely upon the theory that it should not
examine and rule upon a constitutional issue where the lower court
has had an inadequate opportunity to determine that issue, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellant who seeks
review of such an issue must be able to show that it was raised at
the earliest practicable moment..2
In its application to Supreme Court review of state court de-
cisions, this doctrine has been invoked with rigidity and even un-
realistic harshness.3 The constitutional issue must be presented in
the state courts,4 and it cannot be raised for the first time in the
*Associate Professor of Government and Law, Lafayette College. A.B.,
Indiana University; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., Columbia Univer-sity. 1. Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47
Nw. U. L. Rev. 471 (1952).
2. New York v. Kleinert, 268 U. S. 646 (1925); House v. Road Im-
provement Dist., 266 U. S. 175 (1924).
3. See, for example, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (1935).
4. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Church v. Kelsey, 121
U. S. 282 (1887).
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Supreme Court.5 If the question is first presented in the petition for
review by the Supreme Court, it is too late.6 The precise moment
separating seasonable from tardy invocations of the constitutional
issue is a matter controlled by state practice,7 and thus where that
practice limits state supreme court review to questions raised in the
trial court, the constitutional issue must be presented in such trial
court or it is unavailable throughout the subsequent appellate
process.A
Where the Supreme Court reviews the decisions of inferior fed-
eral courts, however, the requirement of seasonable assertion of
constitutional rights has been substantially relaxed except in the
Fourth Amendment area. The Court's power of review over state
courts "is limited ... to the particular claims duly made below, and
denied . . .,"' as distinguished from "the power occasionally exer-
cised on review of judgments of lower federal courts to correct in
criminal cases vital errors, although the objection was not taken in
the trial court. . ... 1 For purposes of Supreme Court review of
inferior federal courts, the constitutional question is seasonably
raised if it is presented in "[m] otions to quash, to instruct the jury
to find for the defendant, for new trial, . . . in arrest of judgment,
... by... exception to rulings on the admission or exclusion of
evidence, .... [or] instructions given or the refusal of instructions
asked. . . ."I" Assertion of the constitutional issue is too late if it
first appears in the assignment of errors.' 2
Application of the Ride in the Fourth Amendment Area. Thus
the general rule is that, for purposes of Supreme Court review of
inferior federal courts, a constitutional issue is seasonably raised
if it is presented at any time during the trial, but in the Fourth
Amendment area this rule is abandoned and seasonable assertion
of such rights is interpreted to mean pre-trial challenge to the search
5. Chapin v. Fye, 170 U. S. 127 (1900) ; Scudder v. Coler, 175 U. S.
32 (1899) ; Morrison v. Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894) ; Marrow v. Brinkley,
129 U. S. 178 (1889).
6. Wabash Ry. v. Flannigan, 192 U. S. 29 (1904); Telluride Power
Co. v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 187 U. S. 569 (1903).
7. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (1935) ; Layton v. Missouri, 187
U. S. 356 (1902).
8. Ibid.; Erie R. R. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148 (1902) ; Baldwin v. Kansas,
129 U. S. 52 (1889).
9. Concurring opinion of Justices Brandeis and Holmes, in Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357, 380 (1927).
10. Ibid.
11. Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695, 697 (1895).
12. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. Thiebaud, 177 U. S. 615 (1900) ; Cornell
v. Green, 163 U. S. 75 (1896) ; Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695 (1895).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
and seizure. 13 Most courts hold that the victim of an unreasonable
search and seizure loses his rights under the Fourth Amendment, or
its counterpart in state constitutions, if he does not assert them prior
to the introduction of the seized evidence in his trial. If he fails
to do so and waits until the evidence has been offered, and then for
the first time raises the question of the legality of the seizure, he
has asserted his rights too late.'4 In United States v. IVernecke,'
Justice (then Circuit Judge) Minton declared that if seized property
was otherwise admissible, "the court will not inquire at the trial
for the first time into the legality of the possession by the Govern-
ment. The validity of the seizure could have been tested in a motion
made before the trial for the return of the papers. No such motion
was made. ... M6 ost federal courts have adopted this view.17
The courts seem particularly emphatic about this requirement where
the objection is not only made for the first time when the seized
evidence is offered at the trial, but it is made "not by formal peti-
tion or motion to suppress the evidence or to require the return
of the documents, but merely by an objection to the admissibility of
the evidence. . . ., $ Where two bills of information were issued
in the same criminal proceeding, and the defendant seasonably as-
serted his Fourth Amendment rights by moving to quash the search
warrant and exclude the evidence under the first information, he has
been held to have lost his rights to exclusion of the evidence by
waiting to renew such motion under the second information until
the evidence was offered in the trial. Under such circumstances the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that "No objection
13. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is used throughout this
article as including both the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and the similar provision which is found in each of
the forty-eight state constitutions. For an example of the problem in the
latter area, see People v. Winn, 324 Ill. 428, 440-441, 155 N. E. 337, 341
(1927), where the court said: "Where it is claimed that evidence against
one accused of crime has been obtained by means of an unlawful search ...
and seizure . . ., the question of such unlawful search and seizure must in
general be presented to the court before the trial, if possible."
14. Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106 (1927).
15. 138 F. 2d 561 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 771 (1944).
16. Id. at 564.
17. Patterson v. United States, 31 F. 2d 737 (9th Cir. 1929); Brink
v. United States, 60 F. 2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 667 (1932) ;
Harkline v. United States, 4 F. 2d 526 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Souza v. United
States, 5 F. 2d 9 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Rossini v. United States. 6 F. 2d 350
(8th Cir. 1925) ; Rocchia v. United States, 78 F. 2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935) ;
Durkin v. United States, 62 F. 2d 305 (1st Cir. 1932); Peters v. United
States, 97 F. 2d 500 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed.
795 (8th Cir. 1920) ; Lyman v. United States, 241 Fed. 945 (9th Cir. 1917);
Lum Yan v. United States, 193 Fed. 970 (9th Cir. 1912).
18. MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
264 U. S. 593 (1924) ; Cardenti v. United States, 24 F. 2d 782 (9th Cir. 1928).
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was made in the proceeding under the new information, nor was
the search challenged in the proceeding under the new information,
until the still was offered in evidence. This was not timely...."I',
Only in the Third Circuit have the federal courts substantially
departed from these principles. In United States v. Asendio,20 the
defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the seizure of
narcotics evidence until he had moved for a new trial, after a ver-
dict of guilty has been rendered. The trial judge overruled the
motion for a new trial, but the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that such ruling was an error despite the fact that the
defendant had failed to move for suppression of the evidence before
trial, or indeed even when such evidence was offered during the
trial. This, of course, permits the defendant to "allow introduction
of questionable evidence without objection in the hope that he may
succeed on the merits, but with the assurance that if he loses, he
may attack such evidence and thereby secure a new trial. '" 2 1
The state courts have been distinctly less uniform in their defi-
nitions of the seasonable requirement. Some have adopted the rule
of the federal courts by holding'that a challenge to the method of
procuring the evidence "is ineffectual when raised for the first
time when such testimony is offered during the progress of the
trial,"22 but most state courts have departed from the federal ver-
sion of this requirement. Thus it has been held that if the search
and seizure challenge is first made when the evidence is offered, it
is the duty of the court to hear argument upon the point and pass
upon the competency of the evidence before admitting it to jury
consideration. 23 In Kentucky an objection to the use of evidence
procured by an unreasonable search and seizure is seasonable even
through it is not made for the first time until all the evidence of both
the prosecution and the defense has been presented.24 Indeed, in that
jurisdiction, a trial judge commits reversible error if he grants a
pre-trial motion to prohibit the introduction of evidence secured by
an unreasonable search and seizure.22
19. Armstrong v. United States, 16 F. 2d 62, 64 (9th Cir. 1926).
20. 171 F. 2d 122 (3d Cir. 1938).
21. Lambert, Evidcnce-Unwconstitntionally Obtained-Titeliness of Ob-
jection in Federal Courts, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1949).
22. State v. Wagner, 311 Mo. 391, 413, 279 S. W. 23, 29 (1925).
23. McNutt v. State, 143 Miss. 347, 351, 108 So. 721, 722 (1926).
24. ,Vathen v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 586, 277 S. W. 839 (1925).
25. "The action of the trial court in suppressing this evidence, whether
it would or would not be competent on the trial, is unauthorized under the
practice in this state. The competency of evidence unlawfully acquired . ..
cannot be drawn and questioned before it is offered on the trial." Common-
wealth v. Meiner, 196 Ky. 840, 842, 245 S. W. 890, 891 (1922).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
As has been indicated, most courts require a pre-trial effort on
the part of the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure to
assert his rights to suppression and/or return of the evidence so
procured. But, for this purpose definitions of what constitutes "pre-
trial" action have been unusually restrictive. For example, where
the defendant first moves for the suppression of the evidence im-
mediately after the jury is impaneled and sworn26 or even while the
clerk of the court was still impaneling the jury,27 the motion has
been held to be too late on the ground that "the machinery of the
court [was] set in motion" and the trial "had in effect begun....
Where an indictment has been returned, and a non-resident defend-
ant was required to give bond to insure his appearance before the
trial court, he may challenge the legality of the seizure of evidence
to be used against him, and seek its suppression at that time, with-
out violating the seasonable requirement.2"
Finally, it should be noted that the federal courts will more
readily hold that the defendant failed to satisfy the requirement of
seasonable assertion of Fourth Amendment rights if he not only
waits until the property procured by the unreasonable search and
seizure is offered in evidence to interpose his objection, but permits
oral testimony concerning the search to precede without objection
such offer of the seized property.30
Implied Waiver as a Basis of the Rule "Even the constitutional
right to move for a return of property illegally seized, and to object
to evidence obtained and offered in violation of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, may be impaired, if not lost, when not season-
ably asserted . . .,"31 and most federal courts have regarded the
defendant's delay in raising the search and seizure point as consti-
tuting a waiver of his right to suppression of the evidence -. 3 2
26. Cardenti v. United States, 24 F. 2d 782 (9th Cir. 1928).
27. People v. Vulje, 223 Mich. 656, 194 N. W. 582 (1923).
28. Id. at 660, 194 N. W. at 584.
29. "Promptly upon complying with the condition of his bond, the point
was raised, and was not thereafter waived. His appearance was analogous
to arrest as of its date, or appearance upon an indictment but newly re-
turned, and it was then not too late to raise the question." Holt v. United
States, 42 F. 2d 103, 104-105 (6th Cir. 1930).
30. "Oral evidence obtained from what we assume was an unreasonable
search was first admitted without objection. Under such circumstances, the
objection taken at the trial came too late." Peters v. United States, 97 F. 2d
500, 502 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Durkin v. United States, 62 F. 2d 305, 306 (1st
Cir. 1932). In the latter case the court said: "Officer Murphy having been
permitted to testify to all that took place [at the time of the search and
seizure] without objection, and before any question was raised that there had
been an unlawful search, it was too late to raise it after the evidence had
been admitted."
31. United States v. Napela, 28 F. 2d 898, 903 (N.D. N.Y. 1928).
32. Cardenti v. United States, 24 F. 2d 782 (9th Cir. 1928); Rossini
[Vol. 37:188
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Defendants Knowledge of Search and Seizure as a Prerequisite
of the Rule. As has been noted, most courts require the defendant
to seek suppression of the unreasonable seized evidence prior to
trial, or he will have lost the power to invoke the exclusionary
rule. This factor, plus the choice of the implied waiver concept as
the basis for requiring such seasonable assertion of Fourth Amend-
ment rights, makes it apparent that the defendant's knowledge
before trial of the existence of the search and seizure is an important
factor. In Gouled v. United States,33 the Supreme Court recognized
the injustice of assigning an implied waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights to a defendant who had not made a pre-trial effort of the
evidence so procured because he did not know of the existence of
the search until the time of the trial when the seized papers were
offered in evidence. "The objection was not too late, for, coming
as it did promptly upon the first notice the defendant had that the
Government was in possession of the paper, the rule of practice
relied upon, that such objection will not be entertained unless made
before trial, was obviously inapplicable. '34 Four years later the
Court reiterated their view in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Butler.33 Thus under Supreme Court sponsorship the doctrine has
developed in federal courts that "where the defendant has no knowl-
edge of the unlawful search and seizure prior to the trial,"'3 and
therefore has had "no opportunity to present the matter in advance
of trial,"37 he will be held to have satisfied the requirement of
seasonable petition for suppression of the evidence if he seeks such
relief when he first learns that the search has been conducted-i.e.
when the government offers property so secured in evidence.38
The Collateral Issue Fiction as a Basis of the Rule. The extent
to which the judicial requirement of seasonable assertion of the
right to suppress unreasonably seized evidence is a manifestation of
Wigmorean influence may be demonstrated by the frequency with
which the courts rely upon the collateral issue argument to support
such a rule. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief
Justice Taft, adopted the view that "the court will not in trying a
v. United States, 6 F. 2d 350 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Peters v. United States, 97
F. 2d 500 (9th Cir. 1938) ; MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U. S. 593 (1924).
33. 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
34. Id. at 305.
35. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
36. Harkline v. United States, 4 F. 2d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 1925).
37. Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 111 (1927).
38. Durkin v. United States, 62 F. 2d 305 (1st Cir. 1932) ; Landwirth
v. United States, 299 Fed. 281 (3d Cir. 1924).
1953]
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criminal cause permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source
of competent evidence . . .,39 and therefore a defendant having
knowledge of the search and seizure before trial must make a pre-
trial assertion of his rights to suppression of evidence procured
thereby. To allow such defendant to wait until the seized property
was offered in evidence, and then assert his objection, would be
to "halt the orderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally
a question wholly independent thereof .... -4o Justice Minton, in an
opinion written while he was still a member of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, endorsed this view. 41 While some
state courts have relied upon this collateral issue basis of the rule, -
the principal criticism of the doctrine has come from a state supreme
court. In Yountan v. Commonwealth,43 a state supreme court de-
cision which has had much influence outside the rendering juris-
diction, the collateral issue basis of the requirement of seasonable
assertion of Fourth Amendment rights was subjected to effective
criticism. "It is a matter of common experience," the court argued,
"that in almost every jury trial the court must occasionally stop
for a time to pass on the competency of evidence to which objection
is made, for the purpose of considering the question raised, and in
some cases, as, for example, where a dying declaration is offered
in a homicide case and objection is made to its competency, it is
the general practice for the court to hear away from the jury the
evidence relating to the declaration, for the purpose of determining
whether it should be admitted."" The force of such contentions will
be recognized by anyone familiar with the American law of evi-
dence. For example, in the judicial administration of the hearsay
rule, the court necessarily must interrupt the trial to determine
whether an offer of hearsay evidence comes within such exceptions
as dying declarations, 45 statements of facts against interest,46 regular
39. Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 112 (1927).
40. Winkle v. United States, 291 Fed. 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1923) ; Salata
v. United States, 286 Fed. 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1923).
41. ". . . the court will not at the trial form and pursue a collateral
issue as to the legality of the possession of the defendant's papers by the
Government." United States v. Wernecke, 138 F. 2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U. S. 771 (1944).
42. People v. Winn. 324 Ill. 428, 155 N. E. 337 (1927); People v.
Vulje, 223 Mich. 656, 194 N. W. 582 (1923).
43. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
44. Id. at 169-170, 224 S. W. at 867-868.
45. Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kans. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914) ; Pendleton v.
Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676, 109 S. E. 201 (1921).
46. Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906); Hines v.
Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843 (1923).
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entries in the course of business,4 7 or any of the other various ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. Similarly, in the judicial administra-
tion of the opinion rule, or the best evidence rule, or any of the
rules of privilege, the court may have to interrupt the trial of the
principal issue to hear argument, and sometimes receive evidence,
in order to determine the applicability of the particular rule of evi-
dence on which rests the objection to its admissibility.
Finally, it should be noted that despite the Supreme Court's
endorsement of the collateral issue objection to delayed assertion
of the right to suppression of unreasonably seized evidence, 48 it has
ruled that the trial court must consider and decide whether the
seizure was unconstitutional even though a motion to return such
evidence was denied before trial.
4
1
Disputed Violation of Search and Seizure Rights as a Pre-
requisite of the Rule. Just as the adoption of the implied waiver
concept as the basis of requirement of seasonable assertion of Fourth
Amendment rights required recognition of an exception where the
defendant had no knowledge of the search and seizure prior to
the actual trial, so also the collateral issue fiction as a basis for the
rule requires recognition of the fact that there may be no dispute
over the Fourth Amendment violation which procured the evidence
sought to be introduced. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Butler, had declared that "where, by uncontro-
verted facts, it appears that a search and seizure were made in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, there is no reason why one
whose rights have been so violated and who is sought to be in-
criminated by evidence so obtained, may not invoke protection of the
Fifth Amendment immediately and without any application for the
return of the thing seized .. " Thus where there is nothing in
the record to dispute the fact that the evidence was procured by a
Fourth Amendment violation, a trial court erred by denying de-
fendant's petition for the return of this property even though such
petition was not presented until after the jury was impaneled.5 The
47. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18
F. 2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927) ; Lebrun v. Boston & Me. Ry., 83 N. H. 293, 142
AtI. 128 (1928).
48. Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106 (1927).
49. "... where, in the progress of a trial, it becomes probable that there
has been an unconstitutional seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial court
to entertain an objection to their admission or a motion for their exclusion
and to consider and decide the question as then presented, even where a
motion to return the papers may have been denied before trial." Gouled v.
United States, 255 U. S. 298, 312-313 (1921).
50. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 34 (1925).
51. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921).
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fact that the collateral issue objection is inapplicable where the un-
constitutionality of the search and seizure is not disputed has been
recognized by some lower federal courts52 and by some state courts 5 3
Government "Surprise" as a Basis of the Rile. Of all the rea-
sons assigned for the insistence upon seasonable assertion of the
right to suppress unreasonably seized evidence, the most inde-
fensible is that to hold otherwise might unfairly surprise the prose-
cution at the trial. Thus one encounters the argument that "had the
government been advised of this objection by a seasonal and timely
application, followed by an order from which it did not desire to
appeal, it might and would otherwise have prepared for trial, and
have procured and had present other evidence fully adequate to
meet the changed situation resulting from a suppression of this
evidence. . . . 14 One may search in vain for a rational cause of
federal courts' concern with the "embarrassments to the prosecu-
tion and the resulting advantage to defendants"" if the defendant is
allowed to make his initial effort to suppress unreasonably seized
evidence at the trial. By the adoption of such a view, the exclusion
rule is materially undercut if not destroyed. That it to say, federal
law enforcement officials may procure evidence in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, await the opening of the trial to see if the
victim of the search will move to suppress the evidence, and if no
such motion is made, the government is relieved of the responsibili-
ty of securing evidence by constitutional means. On the other hand,
if such a pre-trial objection to the use of the evidence is interposed,
the seasonable assertion requirement means that the government
will always be guaranteed additional time in which to procure evi-
dence by legitimate means. The federal courts have taken the
absurd position that to permit the defendant to wait until the gov-
ernment offers the unreasonably seized evidence at the trial to
interpose his objection would be to afford the victim of such search
and seizure "an opportunity to lay a trap which would prevent the
government from producing other testimony of the offense or suffi-
cient testimony concerning the character and sufficiency of the
search and seizure... 56 It is submitted that if the federal exclu-
sionary rule is to have any efficacy the government must be put in
the position of assuming that evidence which it procures by an un-
52. Salata v. United States, 286 Fed. 125 (6th Cir. 1923).
53. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
54. MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (6th Cir.), cert. denicd,
264 U. S. 593 (1924).
55. Cardenti v. United States, 24 F. 2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1928).
56. Rossini v. United States, 6 F. 2d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1925).
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reasonable search and seizure is worthless and of no avail to its
prosecution efforts. To hold that the government which has com-
mitted a wrong of constitutional proportions must be protected
from the victim of such a wrong on the ground that the latter
might "surprise and entrap the government"5 7 is to demonstrate
the extent to which the federal courts have permitted a procedural
device to dilute the substantive protection offered by the federal
exclusionary rule.
Other Bases of the Rule. A related objection has been expressed
in terms of allowing the defendant to gamble on the outcome of
the case by delaying his objection to the admissibility of the un-
reasonably seized evidence. It has been argued that a defendant
should not be "permitted to speculate on the outcome of the state's
case, and, after ascertaining that the state's evidence is of an in-
criminating nature, then, for the first time, interpose an objection
that it was illegally obtained." Such a contention is unrealistic be-
cause both the government which seized the evidence, and the de-
fendant from whom the evidence was taken, know the incriminating
nature of such property in advance of the trial. And to argue that
the federal exclusionary rule should not permit the defendant "to
allow introduction of questionable evidence without objection in
the hope that he may succeed on the merits, but with the assurance
that if he loses, he may attack such evidence and thereby secure a
new trial,"5 19 is equally unrealistic. Such argument assumes that the
requirement of seasonable assertion of Fourth Amendment rights
may be satisfied at any time prior to the verdict, but as has been
shown above, such is not the case. Conceding that a defendant should
never be allowed to gamble on a verdict, and then interpose an
objection not presented to the trial judge, it does not follow that
a violation of that principle occurs where he interposes the objec-
tion at the time the prosecution offers the unreasonably seized
property in evidence.
Finally, it has sometimes been argued that the expense and delay
involved in hearing an objection to admissibility of evidence after
the trial has begun is adequate to deny that right to the defendant
victim of the unreasonable search. The refusal of the courts to
57. MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
264 U. S. 593 (1924).
58. Webb v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 77, 79, 242 Pac. 784 (1926).
59. Lambert, Evidence-Unconstitutionally Obtained-Timeliness of Ob-jection i Federal Courts, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1949).
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"pause or delay the trial to determine how the evidence was pro-
cured" 60 has also been subjected to justified criticism. 1
Conclusions. From the foregoing analysis of the seasonable as-
sertion rule, six conclusions emerge.
First, the Supreme Court strictly adheres to the rule that, in
its review of state courts, constitutional issues must be presented
in the trial court or be unavailable on review, but, aside from the
Fourth Amendment area, the Court has relaxed the application of
the rule in review of inferior federal court decisions.
Second, in its review of inferior federal courts in the Fourth
Amendment area, however, the Court has applied the rule in an
even more restrictive sense than it is applied to state courts in most
areas--i.e., seasonable challenge of an unreasonable search and
seizure in federal courts means pre-trial challenge.
Third, most state courts, in the interpretation of the state con-
stitutions' provisions on unreasonable searches and seizures, have
rejected the federal courts equation of seasonable assertion with
pre-trial assertion of such rights.
Fourth, the adoption of an implied waiver theory, as a basis for
the requirement of a pre-trial challenge to the search and seizure,
has caused the creation of an exception to the rule where the victim
of the search had no knowledge thereof prior to the trial.
Fifth, the adoption of the Wigmorean collateral issue theory
as a basis for the pre-trial requirement has caused the creation of
a further exception to the rule where there is no dispute as to the
unconstitutionality of the seizure.
Sixth, the least defensible theory invoked as a basis for the
pre-trial requirement is that of "surprising" the very government
whose agents committed the violation of the Fourth Amendment.
60. McSwain v. State, 89 Ind. App. 592, 599, 167 N. E. 568, 569 (1929);
Rossini v. United States, 6 F. 2d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1925).
61. Youman v. Commonvealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
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